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Compensation Techniques
by J A C K M A C Y

Partner, Chicago Office
Presented before the Ninth Annual Tax Conference of the Illinois
Society of Certified Public Accountants, Chicago—December 1963

existing tax laws, simple compensation payable currently
U in cash
and fully taxable can rarely be adequate to permit an
NDER

employee, particularly at the executive level, to provide for his retirement as well as for his current requirements. For the employee to
receive advantageous treatment and for the employer to obtain and
keep capable executives, it is usually necessary to devise other compensation techniques.
Perhaps the commonest of these techniques is the qualified pension or profit-sharing plan. Such plans have the benefit of current
deductions for the employer with deferral of the employee's tax.
Consequently, the possibility of using this type of plan should be
carefully considered.
However, qualified plans have limitations, particularly with respect to the contributions that may be made on behalf of the higherpaid employees. Additional, more flexible plans may therefore be
desirable even though they do not qualify.
FUNDING NON-QUALIFIED D E F E R R E D COMPENSATION

Ordinarily, any plan of deferred compensation that does not
constitute a qualified plan should not be funded. The reason is that
funding may result in adverse tax consequences.
If the rights of the employee are nonforfeitable at the time payments are made into nonqualified plans, the employee is immediately
taxable. Thus, he not only receives no tax advantage but will be
confronted with the necessity of raising the funds to pay taxes on
money that he has not received.
If the employee's rights are forfeitable when the employer's payments are made, the employee will generally not be taxed until he
receives benefits. In this case, the principal adverse tax consequences
pertain to the employer. The employer will not be entitled to any
deduction at the time of contribution where the employee's rights
are forfeitable at that time. It is the Treasury position that no deduction can be claimed in a subsequent year when payments are made
to the employee. The basis of this position is that there is no accrual
in a subsequent year.
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This Treasury position is not supported by the Court of Claims,
which holds that the employer is entitled to a deduction when amounts
are paid to the employee (Russell, 175 F. Supp. 159). The Treasury
is unwilling to follow this rule. Consequently the employer's deduction is, at best, deferred and can be obtained at any time only by
litigation, if at all.
Although funding a nonqualified plan has the adverse consequences just discussed, the employee may still desire some security
beyond the general credit of the employer, particularly if the employer is other than the strongest possible corporation. There has
been some litigation over the question of whether specific investments by the employer, such as in an insurance policy providing for
payments corresponding to the employee's rights, would constitute
funding, particularly in a closely held corporation. It now appears
reasonably clear that such investments do not constitute funding,
provided they constitute general investments of the employer and
the employee has no special rights or preferred position with respect
to them. Whether such investments increase the employee's security
would be a matter to be considered in each situation.
CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS

In view of these considerations, the usually preferred form of
deferred compensation plan is an unfunded contractual arrangement
whereby the employer agrees to make payments to the employee
extending into the period of his retirement, at which time the employee's tax bracket will presumably be more favorable. A question
to which considerable thought has been given in this type of plan
is whether the employee's tax can possibly be accelerated by the
Treasury under some theory of cash equivalent or constructive receipt.
Generally, the courts have refused to tax the unsecured promise
of an employer as equivalent to cash regardless of its financial standing.
In one case (Wolfe, 8 TC 689) taxpayer had been employed by
subsidiaries of Standard Oil Company of New Jersey. One of these
subsidiaries made a payment to Standard, and Standard agreed in
writing to pay and did pay the employee certain amounts each year
upon his retirement. The employee was taxable only as amounts
were actually received. Because of the relationships between the
companies, this was held to be merely an arrangement to pay a pension rather than an annuity contract. Cases concerning ordinary
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commercial annuity contracts purchased by employers from insurance
companies for employees were distinguished. In spite of the payment made, the agreement to carry out the pension policy in this
case was not considered to have such value as to be taxable to the
employee until he actually received payments.
The Internal Revenue Service has published a somewhat detailed
discussion of the problem and its position (Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1
CB 174). A mere promise to pay, not represented by notes or security
in any way, is not regarded as a receipt of income under the cashreceipts-and-disbursements method. Although under the doctrine
of constructive receipt a taxpayer may not deliberately turn his back
on income and thereby select the year for which he will report it,
the statute cannot be administered by speculating whether the payor
would have been willing to agree to an earlier payment. The determination in each case must be made on the basis of the specific facts
as they exist.
In one Internal Revenue Service example certain amounts were
credited to a reserve each year that the taxpayer worked, pursuant
to a contract. Payout of the reserve was to begin upon termination
of employment or the commencement of disability. The amount in
the reserve was to be paid out over a five-year period. In the event
of the failure of the employee to perform his duties no further credits
would be made to the reserve, but the employee would have a right
to receive the amounts previously credited. There was no provision
for forfeiture of the employee's rights to distribution from the
reserve, and in the event of his death his personal representative
would receive the remaining amounts. Under these circumstances
the Internal Revenue Service held that the employee would be taxed
only as payments were received.
A similar result was reached where the reserve accounts were
credited with amounts in relation to the employer's profits and also
with net amounts realized from investing any portion of the amount
in the account. In this case there were provisions requiring the employee to refrain from engaging in any business competitive with
that of the employer and requiring him to be available for consultation.
A third example dealt with an agreement between an author
and a publisher. The publisher agreed to pay specified royalties
based on the actual cash received from the sale of the published
work. At the same time another agreement between the parties
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provided that no more than a certain amount should be paid in any
one calendar year. Any excess of the amounts accruing over the
maximum payment would be carried over into succeeding accounting
periods. The author was required to include amounts in income only
as actually received. The essential point here appears to have been
that the agreement limiting the payments in any one year was entered
into before the royalties were earned. Presumably an agreement
entered into after royalties were earned would constitute the author's
turning his back on income.
In a fourth example the employee entered into a contract whereby he was to be paid part of the consideration over a five-year
period. However, the employer was required to and did place the full
amount in escrow with a bank. The amount in question was held
income to the employee when the payment was made to the escrow
agent.
In the final example discussed in this ruling a boxer entered
into an agreement with a boxing club whereby he was to receive a
certain percentage of the gate, payable however over a period of
three years. In this case the boxer was considered to have entered
into a joint venture and was not an employee. His share of the gross
receipts was considered to have belonged to him right from the
beginning and was immediately taxable to him.
The Internal Revenue Service is also understood to consider
that any pledge or deposit of collateral is equivalent to a trust or
escrow arrangement and results in taxability to the employee at the
time of deposit. This view appears doubtful in the light of several
cases holding that the deposit of collateral does not constitute payment. In one Supreme Court case (Price, 309 U.S. 409) it was stated:
"Respondent urges that his note was secured, but the collateral was
not payment. It was given to secure respondent's promise to pay and
if that promise to pay was not sufficient to warrant the deduction
until the promise was made good by actual payment, the giving of
security for performance did not transform the promise into the payment required."
In view of the Internal Revenue Service position, however, it is
probably safest to omit any direct security for the employer's promise.
CONDITIONS ON LIABILITY

It has usually been considered to be the part of wisdom to include
conditions in any deferred compensation agreements of the type here
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being considered. The commonest conditions are agreement not to
compete after retirement and agreement that the employee continue
to make himself available for consultation. One of the examples in
the ruling previously discussed indicates that the deferred compensation result can be achieved even in the absence of conditions of
this kind. However, each case stands on its own facts and the Internal
Revenue Service normally declines to issue advance rulings on specific deferred compensation cases.
Therefore, it appears that including this type of condition in
deferred compensation agreements may still be advantageous. However, where continued consultation is made available, a question does
arise concerning the recipient's social security benefits.
E F F E C T ON "SEPARATION F R O M T H E SERVICE"

Perhaps a more serious consideration in many cases is the effect
on capital gains treatment of lump-sum distributions from a qualified
employee trust. Generally, if the total distributions payable to any
employee are paid to him within one taxable year, on account of his
death "or other separation from the service," he is entitled to capital
gains treatment on the distribution. If the individual is required to
render advisory service under a deferred compensation arrangement
a question arises about whether he may be said to have been separated
from the employer's service.
In one case (Fry, 19 TC 461) the individual spent a certain
amount of time after his retirement training new employees for the
type of work that he had been doing. He nevertheless continued to
draw his regular salary. He was held not entitled to capital gains
treatment on the basis that he had not severed his connection with
his employer.
The Internal Revenue Service has ruled (Rev. Rul. 57-115, 1957-1
CB 160) adversely in the case of an individual who continued to act in
the capacity of an officer and director. "Rendition of services or being
employed to render services and not the element of compensation is
the determinative factor in seeking to establish whether or not there
has been a separation from the service." (See also Bolden, 39 TC No.
85). It may be noted that this ruling refers to services both as an
officer and as a director. The result might be different if the individual
served only as a director. Generally, service as a director does not
constitute service as an employee. However, the Code (section 402(a)
(2)) refers to "separation from the service." Presumably, this refers to
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service as an employee and the Internal Revenue Service is understood so to hold, although it might be argued that a director continues in the company's service even though not as an employee. A
recent ruling (Rev. Rul. 63-22, 1963-8 IRB 14) allows capital gains
treatment where the individual was subsequently elected by the shareholders to serve as liquidator of the corporation.
It would therefore seem that the consultation provision in a deferred compensation agreement, if it has any substance, would probably destroy the employee's right to capital gains treatment on a lumpsum distribution from a qualified trust. In a recent case (Bolden,
supra) the individual was denied capital gains treatment where he had
agreed to stay in the company's employ in an advisory and consulting
capacity. Apparently his actual services were somewhat nominal.
"The mere fact that the company did not demand the hours of service
contracted for or call upon him more often for advice does not prove
that the petitioner was not employed . . . nor does it deprive the payment of its compensatory nature. It was similar to a retainer fee."
STOCK OPTION PLANS

Another compensation technique that is very popular is the
stock option plan. In the case of listed or actively traded corporations
the restricted stock option plan has been very frequently adopted.
Under such plans the corporation receives no deduction but the employee may obtain all, or substantially all, of his gain at capital gains
rates.
For various reasons, the restricted stock option is less attractive
to the closely held corporation. One of the principal problems is the
difficulty in establishing the fair market value of the stock. In order
to qualify as a restricted stock option plan the option price must be at
least 85 per cent of the fair market value of the stock at the time the
option is granted. If there is no reasonably sure way of determining
the fair market value of the stock, there can be no reasonable certainty that any given plan will qualify. The Internal Revenue Service
declines to accept a plan where the price is subject to adjustment to
conform with the results of a tax examination. Even if the Internal
Revenue Service were willing to accept such a formula, there would
be a serious question concerning the desirability of such a plan to the
employee, for he would be obligating himself to buy stock at a price
that might be subject to considerable adjustment at a later date. The
Revenue Bill of 1963 may ameliorate this problem by providing a
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penalty rather than complete disqualification if the option price is too
low. On the other hand, it may create additional problems by raising
the qualifying percentage of market.
Perhaps more suited to the problems of many corporations is the
unrestricted stock option. Under such a plan, the corporation obtains
a deduction for the compensation element and the employee pays a
tax thereon. The question in this type of plan, however, is: When does
compensation occur and how is it measured?
Before the Smith (325 U.S. 177) and LoBue (351 U.S. 243) cases,
it was often argued that there was no element of compensation in a
situation where there was no spread between the option price and
stock value at the time the option was issued. However, it now appears that if there was no market value at the grant date of an option,
it will be inferred that there was an intent to give compensation at
some later time "after the anticipated advance in the market price of
the stock." (Smith.)

It is recognized that the recipient of a stock option might, under
other circumstances, realize an immediate taxable gain where the option would have a readily ascertainable market value and the recipient
would be free to sell his option.
This principle is recognized in the Regulations (section 1.421-6).
But, the Regulations state that "value is ordinarily not readily ascertainable unless the option is actively traded on an established
market." "The fair market value of an option is not merely the
difference which may exist at a particular time between the option
price and the value of the property subject to the option, but also includes the value of the option privilege. Accordingly, the fair market
value of the option is not readily ascertainable unless the value of the
option privilege can be measured with reasonable accuracy."
However, in a recent case (Colton, 209 F. Supp. 381) it was
pointed out that it "would seem implicit in the cases that the determination of the value of the option depends upon whether the option
price exceeds the market price or not." The case nevertheless found
a value for the option greater than the difference between the market
price of the stock and the option price, which additional amount
represented the value of the option privilege. The taxpayer had contended for this larger value in partial support of his contention that
the option did in fact have a value at the time it was granted. Therefore, the case did not specifically sustain the Regulation provision.
An important and perhaps controlling element under the cases is
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whether the employer and the employee intended that the option
itself be the compensation, or whether they intended the subsequent
appreciation in the stock to be the element of compensation. If the
employer deducts the value of the option and the employee includes
it in income, this will be evidence of their intention that the option
should represent the compensation (McNamara, 210 F. (2d) 505).
However, failure to treat the grant of the option in this manner is only
evidentiary and not conclusive (Colton, supra).
With respect to the Regulation requirement that the value of the
option is ordinarily not readily ascertainable unless the option is
actively traded, the recent case previously referred to accepted the
testimony of an experienced stock broker. This approach would
appear reasonable. It would also appear that the value of the option
is a question of fact, and the intent of the parties to make the option
the compensation should not be destroyed because their valuation of
it is inexact, and perhaps changed on examination.
Nevertheless, in view of the Regulation provision in this matter,
it would appear that controversy is almost sure to result from an
attempt to treat the granting of the option itself, rather than its
exercise, as compensation unless there is active trading in the option.
Where the option does not have a readily ascertainable fair
market value at the time of grant, the Regulation provides generally
that the employee realizes compensation at the time he exercises the
option, provided the stock received is not subject to any restrictions
that have a substantial effect on its market value. In the absence of
such restrictions, the amount of compensation is the difference between the fair market value of the stock and the option price at the
time option is exercised.
Where there are substantial restrictions that affect value at the
time of exercise, compensation is not realized until the restrictions
are removed (or the property is sold, if that occurs before the restrictions are removed). The amount of compensation realized is the lesser
of the amounts computed by taking a measurement: first, at the date
of exercise of the option; and second, at the date the restrictions are
removed (or the stock is sold).
The measure at the date the option is exercised is the difference
between the fair value of the stock without regard to restrictions and
the option price. The measure at the date the restrictions are removed
is the difference between the fair market value at that time and the
option price.
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In a closely held corporation perhaps the principal use of the
option is to obtain managerial ability from one or more individuals
who are not part of the control group. In such companies, the control group is often unwilling to have the stock remain with the executive after he leaves the company's employ or have it get into the hands
of the public under any circumstances. For these reasons, there is
frequently a provision that the optionee must sell or at least offer
his stock to the corporation or other stockholders in the event that
he leaves the company's employ or before he sells the stock to any
outsiders.
If the requirement is merely that the employee offer to sell the
stock to his employer at its fair market value at the time of sale, that
restriction is not considered to affect fair market value in a significant way. Under these circumstances the employee realizes compensation at the time he exercises his option.
If, however, the employee is required to sell the stock back at
book value, this condition does constitute a significant restriction.
Compensation, therefore, is realized only at the time the restriction is
removed or the stock is actually sold.
This latter provision—that the employee will sell his stock back
at book value—can work to reasonable advantage. The employee can
be given his stock at any price without the realization of any compensation at the time he exercises his option. If the stock is dividendpaying, he can, of course, begin to participate in these distributions.
He will also benefit by any increases in book value—presumably owing
in part, at least, to his efforts. It is true that the difference between
the option price and the amount at which he sells the stock back will
ultimately be taxed to him at ordinary rates. However, the employer
is entitled to a corresponding deduction at the same time which may
soften the over-all tax blow considerably, if not entirely, depending on
the respective brackets of the employer-corporation and the employee.
Under the averaging provisions of the Revenue Bill of 1963 the
effect of a possible substantial inclusion in income in one year would
tend to be mitigated. Alternatively, the sell-back could take place
over a period of years.
FRINGE BENEFITS

In addition to some of the basic compensation techniques previously discussed, there are various fringe benefits that may be provided tax-free to the employees. Among the most important of these
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fringe benefits are certain kinds of insurance protection, including
accident and health.
One of the major insurance benefits available is pointed out and
may be somewhat modified by the Revenue Bill of 1963. This benefit
relates to group term life insurance. Under the Regulations (section
1.61-2(d) (2)) it is stated that "premiums paid by an employer on
policies of group term life insurance covering the lives of his employees
are not gross income to the employees even if they designate the beneficiaries." Under the provisions of the 1963 Revenue Bill the employee
will no longer be tax exempt to the extent that the insurance coverage
provided is in excess of $30,000. However, insurance coverage up to
$30,000 under group term policies will continue to be exempt.
CONCLUSION

The problems of getting and keeping capable management personnel continue to be acute. Methods by which compensation can
be given that is not immediately passed to the taxing authority with
the employee acting as a mere conduit will therefore continue to be of
great importance to the business community.
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